This study investigates earnings management of CEO changes in Indonesia. CEO change is classified either as routine or non-routine based on RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting) and RUPSLB (Extraordinary General Shareholders Meeting) information. The samples are listed company undergoing CEO changes in the Indonesian Stock Market observed from 2000 to 2009. To identify the earnings management practice, modified Jones model of discretionary accruals and Rowchordory’ of real earnings management are employed. The study provides evidence of non-routine incoming CEO undertaking earnings management by minimizing the earnings in the year of CEO change. The evidence shows that reporting minimum earnings is consistent with the notion of new CEO’s engagement in an ‘earnings bath’. However, this study does not support the theory of management compensation contracts during routine CEO changes. In addition, the incumbent CEO in the non-routine changes does not practice earnings management in the final year before the change. Therefore, manipulating earnings is not the argument to a non routine change of CEO.
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